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OF NATIVE AMERICAN 
INDIAN PROPERTY 
ANTHONY PEIRSON XAVIER BOTHWELL • 
At the dawn of the white man's millenium, the drums of 15 million 
ghosts echo silently across fields and forests, mountains and deserts, 
lakes and rivers of once proud peoples. While American society aspires 
to realize more perfect justice in the twenty-first century, surviving 
members of great tribes, heirs of a continent, are the poorest of the poor. 
Iroquois. Cherokee. Choctaw. Seminole. Pueblo. Apache. Navajo. 
Five hundred nations. Nations that were betrayed, subjugated, plundered 
and forgotten. We cannot undo that which was done - the breaking of 
treaties, the trail of tears, all the sorrows of long-ago years. We cannot 
bring back to the world of the living those who perished in the American 
holocaust. We cannot take away homes and enterprises of present-day 
Americans to pay tribute to indigenous people who passed to their final 
hunting ground in that apocalypse of more than a century ago. But if 
justice on this earth can be imagined, so can a practical way to achieve it. 
Provided, that is, we are willing to reconcile ourselves to each other, and 
to historical truth. 
* Member, The State Bar of California, American Bar Association, National Lawyers 
Guild, and International Bar Association; B.S.F.S., Georgetown University School of Foreign 
Service; M.S., Boston University School of Public Communication; J.D., John F. Kennedy 
University School of Law; Class of 2000, LL.M. Program in International Legal Studies, Golden 
Gate University School of Law. 
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Before the first Europeans landed in what to them was a New World, as 
many as 15 million indigenous people lived in the area now occupied by 
the 50 states of the Union. I The white man took their land and, in the 
doing of it, took their lives. The Native Americans were almost 
exterminated. By 1910, only about 200,000 American Indians still lived. 
Thus it was "proportionately as if the population of the United States 
were to decrease from its present level to the population of Cleveland.,,2 
The magnitude of mass death was even greater than that of the 
Holocaust, in which six million Jews perished. The loss of the land, 
more than two billion acres from the AtlantiC to the Pacific, was so vast 
that it admits of no comparison in world history. 
The taking of the continent occasioned untold deaths due to battles, 
massacres, forced marches, starvation, disease and broken hearts. The 
white settlers brought from Europe "a terrible collection of poxes and 
fluxes, flus and fevers for which the reds had little or no natural 
immunity. ,,3 An 1855 Sacramento newspaper editorial said: 
The accounts from the North indicate the commencement of a 
war of extermination against the Indians . . .. The intrusion of 
the white man upon the Indians' hunting grounds has driven off 
the game and destroyed their fisheries. The consequence is . . . 
starvation . . . stealing and killing. Had reasonable care been 
exercised to see that they were provided with something to eat .. 
. no necessity would have presented itself for an indiscriminate 
slaughter of the race.4 
The destruction of Native American nations is all the more ironic in light 
of the contribution Indians made to the formation of our country. Our 
Founders had extensive and generally friendly interactions with the 
Native Americans, who consequently exerted formative influences on 
our art, food and culture, our appreciation of nature, and our ideas about 
democracy. Their disrespect for authority influenced our own 
revolutionaries. Their penchant for helping others set an example for us. 
So did their thirst for freedom, and their commitment to participative 
democracy. Franklin, Jefferson and others internalized Indian political 
1. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAw: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACfICES 23 (1993). 
2. Louise Erdrich, Where / Ought to Be: A Writer's Sense of Place, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV. 
1,23 (July 18, 1985). 
3. BIL GILBERT, GoD GAVE Us THIs COUNTRY: TAKAMTHI AND THE FIRST AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR 25 (1990). 
4. Quoted by ROBERT F. HEIZER, THE DESTRUCfION OF CALIFORNIA iNDIANS 35, 36 
(1974). 
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and social concepts, and embraced ideas of personal liberty that went far 
beyond anything ever imagined in England, from which the framework 
of our law came. Iroquois federalism - with six nations (Mohawks, 
Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, Tuscaroras and Senecas) in a league, 
having checks and balances, separation of civilian and military authority, 
limited government, protection of individual rights, and tolerance for all 
religious views - set a model for our federal system.s 
II. INDIAN TRIBES BECAME SOVEREIGN AND INDEPEND-
ENT NATIONS RECOGNIZED PURSUANT TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
By the time European explorers began amvmg along the Atlantic 
seaboard, Native American nations already were well-established. In 
fact, the Indian nations possessed the requisite attributes of sovereign, 
independent states under international law as then it existed. It follows 
from this that the potentates, agents and exiles of Christian states did not 
have any right simply to take away that which belonged to the Native 
Americans. 
Francisco de Vitoria, one of the founders of international law, taught that 
the Europeans had a duty to respect the American Indians' autonomous 
powers and land entitlements.6 He said the indigenous Americans "have 
polities which are orderly arranged and they have definite marriage and 
magistrates, overlords, laws, and workshops and a system of exchange. ,,7 
Vitoria said the Indians owned the land in America, and that "discovery" 
by Spanish explorers could not transfer title to the land "anymore than if 
it had been they who had discovered us. ,,8 Vitoria's guidelines for 
European dealings with Native Americans helped to develop a system of 
international law applying to all peoples worldwide.9 And Hugo Grotius, 
father of international law, taught that "the right to enter into treaties is 
so common to all men that it does not admit of a distinction arising from 
5. BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, FORGOITEN FOUNDERS: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE IROQUOIS AND 
THE RATIONALE FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4-8 (1982). 
6. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEoPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 10 (1996). 
7. FRANCISCO DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES (Classics of 
International Law Series, 1917) (translation by J. Bate based on Iaques Boyer, ed., 1557, Alonso 
Munoz, ed., 1565, & Johann G. Simon, ed., 1696) (using the Latin version of his name, "Victoria"). 
8. [d. at 139. 
9. ANAYA, supra note 6, at 10-11 (1996). 
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religion";\O thus, the indigenous nations of America were as sovereign as 
the Christian states of Europe. 
Chief Justice John Marshall discussed statehood in Cherokee Nation V. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), in which he postulated that the Cherokees 
were a "dependent domestic" nation. II 
And yet Marshall, writing for the high court the following year in 
Worcester V. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542-543 (1832), acknowledged that 
the Indian tribes were sovereign and independent nations prior to their 
discovery by European explorers. 12 
As for the significance of the charters granted by the English king,· 
Marshall conceded in Worcester, "The extravagant and absurd idea, that 
the feeble settlements made on the sea coast, or the companies under 
whom they were made, acquired legitimate power by them to govern the 
people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any 
10. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAWOF WAR AND PEACE 397 (Classics of International Law ed. 
1925). 
11. Cherokee Nation V. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1830), 16: "Is the Cherokee nation a foreign 
state in the sense in which that tenn is used in the constitution? 
They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country. The 
numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them as a people capable of 
maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their political character for any 
violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States 
by any individual of their community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The 
acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by 
those acts. 
Marshall continued on the next page: "The Indian territory is admitted to compose a part 
of the United States. . .. They may ... be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy 
a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will . . .. Meanwhile they are in a state of 
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." 
12. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542-543 (1832). America, separated from Europe by 
a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people" divided into separate nations, independent of each 
other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their 
own laws. It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the 
globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the 
lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give the discoverer rights in 
the country discovered, which annulied the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors. 
"After lying concealed for a series of ages, the enterprise of Europe guided by nautical 
science, conducted some of her adventurous into this western world. They found it in possession of 
a people who had made small progress in agriculture or manufactures, and whose general 
employment was war, hunting, and fishing. 
"Did these adventurers, by sailing along the coast, and occasionally landing on it, acquire 
for the several governments to whom they belonged, or by whom they were commissioned, a 
rightful property in the soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific; or rightful dominion over the numerous 
people who occupied it? Or has nature, the great Creator of all things, conferred these rights over 
hunters and fishennen, on agriculturalists and manufacturers? 
"B ut power, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the 
world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they descend." 
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man.,,13 What William Penn, Lord Baltimore and the other charter 
holders got by virtue of discovery, Marshall said, was (a) true title 
subject only to the Indians' mere occupancy and (b) the right to wage 
"defensive war"14 which would extinguish even the Indians' occupancy 
rights. IS 
The Chief Justice noted that the colonists knew the Indians "might be 
formidable enemies, or effective friends," and so "their alliance was 
sought by flattering professions, and purchased by rich presents. The 
English, the French, and the Spaniards, were equally competitors for 
their friendship and their aid." And he quoted the British superintendent 
of Indian affairs, a Mr. Stuart, who told Indian leaders in a gathering at 
Mobile soon after the peace of 1763: "As you may be assured that all 
treaties with your people will be faithfully kept, so it is expected that 
you, also, will be careful strictly to observe them." In the network of 
alliances that existed in the period leading up to the American 
Revolution, the English crown protected Indian nations from other 
Europeans, and allied Indians protected the crown colonies from other 
Indians and from the French. Marshall said the Indian treaties "had 
never been misunderstood. They had never been supposed to imply a 
right in the British government to take their lands, or to interfere with 
their internal government . . .. The only inference to be drawn from 
them is, that the United States considered the Cherokees as a nation.,.t6 
Thus it was recognized that the American Indian nations were sovereign 
and independent nations until the whites came and took away many of 
their rights and then declared them to be absorbed within the United 
States. Justice Thompson's insightful dissent in Cherokee Nation 
elaborated on the undeniable sovereignty of the Cherokees under 
. . all 17 mternatlOn aw. 
13. /d. at 544-545. 
14. [d. at 545. 
15. [d. at 545-548,553. 
16. [d. at 515,543-560. 
17. Cherokee Nation, supra note 11, at 52-54: "The terms state and nation are used in the 
law of nations, as well as in common parlance, as importing the same thing; and imply a body of 
men, united together, to procure their mutual safety and advantage by means of their union. Such a 
society has its affairs and interests to manage; it deliberates, and takes resolutions in common, and 
thus becomes a moral person, have an understanding a will peculiar to itself. . .. Vattel, 1. .... 
Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without any dependence on a foreign 
power, is a sovereign state. Its rights are naturally the same as those of any other state. Such are 
moral persons who live together in a natural society, under the law of nations. It is sufficient if it be 
really sovereign and independent; that is, it must govern itself by its own authority and laws .... 
Tributory and feudatory states do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long 
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The practice of the young United States in forming treaties with Indian 
tribes is evidence that the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution 
recognized the status of Indian nations as sovereign and independent 
nations. Even before the Constitution was ratified, the Confederation 
negotiated treaties such as the 1778 treaty with the Delaware Nation. 
Chief Justice Marshall, in the Worcester decision, discussed at length the 
treaty with the Delawares, noting the "language of equality in which it is 
drawn .... "lS Justice Thompson, in his Cherokee Nation dissent, 
recalled that the treaty with the Delaware Indians 
may serve to show in what light the Indian nations were viewed 
by the congress at that day. . .. This treaty, both in form and 
substance purports to be an arrangement with an independent 
sovereign power. It ... contains stipulations relative to peace 
and war, and for permission to the United States troops to pass 
through the country of the Delaware nation. And the same 
recognition of their rights runs through all the treaties made with 
the Indian nations or tribes, from that day down to the present 
time. 19 
The adoption of the Holston treaty of 1791 demonstrated the intent of our 
first President and the senate with respect to recognition of the Cherokee 
Nation as a foreign power. Justice Thompson pointed out: 
The treaty was made soon after the adoption of the present 
constitution. And in the last article it declared that it shall take 
effect, and be obligatory upon the contracting parties as soon as 
the same shall have been ratified by the president of the United 
States, with the advice and consent of the senate; thereby 
as self-government, and sovereign and independent authority is left in the administration of the state. 
Vattel, c.l, pp. 16, 17. 
"Testing the character and condition of the Cherokee Indians by these rules, it is not 
perceived how it is possible to escape the conclusion, that they form a sovereign state. They have 
always been dealt with as such by the government of the United States; both before and since the 
adoption of the present constitution. They have been admitted and treated as a people governed 
solely and exclusively by their own laws, usages, and customs within their own territory, claiming 
and exercising exclusive dominion over the same; yielding up by treaty, from time to time, portions 
of their land but still claiming absolute sovereignty and self government over what remained unsold. 
And this has been the light in which they have, until recently, been considered from the earliest 
settlement of the country by the white people. And indeed, I do not understand it is denied by a 
majority of the court, that the Cherokee Indians form a sovereign state according to the doctrine of 
the law of nations; but that, although a sovereign state, they are not considered a foreign state within 
the meaning of the constitution." 
18. Worcester, supra note 12, at 549. 
19. Cherokee Nation, supra note 11, at 65-66. 
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showing the early opinion of the government of the character of 
the Cherokee nation. The contract is made by way of treaty, and 
to be ratified in the same manner as all other treaties made with 
sovereign and independent nations; and which has been the 
mode of negotiating all subsequent Indian treaties. 
And this course was adopted by President Washington upon 
great consideration, by and with the previous advice and 
concurrence of the senate. In his message sent to the senate on 
that occasion, he states, that the white people had intruded on the 
Indian lands, as bounded by the treaty of Hopewell, and declares 
his determination to execute the power entrusted to him by the 
constitution to carry that treaty into fruitful execution .... 20 
181 
Yet another fallacy in the position of those who deny the sovereignty of 
Indian nations - this one having to do with the citizenship status of the 
Indians - was pointed out by Justice Thompson. He wrote that the 
U.S.-Cherokee treaties of December 26, 1817 and March 10, 1819, for 
example, stipulated that Indians choosing to do so could become citizens 
of the United States, 
thereby clearly showing that they were not considered citizens at 
the time those stipulations were entered into, or the provision 
would have been entirely unnecessary if not absurd. And if not 
citizens, they must be aliens or foreigners, and such must be the 
character of each individual belonging to the nation. And it was, 
therefore, very aptly asked on the argument, and I think not very 
easily answered, how a nation composed of aliens or foreigners 
can be other than a foreign nation?) 
In the same vein, Justice M'Lean, concurring in Worcester, wrote: "No 
one has ever supposed that the Indians could commit treason against the 
United States. We have punished them for their violation of treaties; but 
we have inflicted the punishment on them as a nation, and not on 
individual offenders among them as traitors.'t22 
Chief Justice Marshall for the court in the seminal case of Johnson v. 
M1ntoch, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), did not deny that the taking of Indian 
20. [d. at 71. 
21. [d. at 66. 
22. Worcester, supra note 12, at 582. 
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sovereignty and land was unjust and violative of international law.23 
Although the U.S. Constitution recognizes the valid force of international 
law, the Framers gave the federal authorities constitutional power to act 
in violation of international law.24 When the United States violates 
international law, U.S. courts offer no remedy unless the Constitution or 
laws of the United States were at the same time violated. However, U.S. 
violation of international law, even when constitutional and in accord 
with domestic law, does not relieve the United States of its international 
responsibilities; i.e., its obligations to the world community, under 
international law - which has the binding force of law even in those 
instances when United States courts are disabled from enforcing it. Thus 
the liability of the United States as a member of the world community 
was acknowledged by Secretary of State Bayard in 1887: 
It has been constantly maintained and also admitted by the 
Government of the United States that a government can not 
appeal to its municipal regulations as an answer to the demands 
for the fulfillment of international duties. Such regulations may 
either exceed or fall short of the requirements of international 
law, and in either case that law furnishes the test of the nation's 
liability and not its own municipal rules?5 
In the emergent era of colonial expansionism, ethnocentrists such as John 
Westlake argued that international law existed to protect "civilised" 
people only and that, since indigenous people were "uncivilised 
humanity," they could not claim the protection of international law. The 
British publicist wrote that the 
inflow of the white race cannot be stopped where there is land to 
cultivate, ore to be mined, commerce to be developed, sport to 
enjoy, curiosity to be satisfied. If any fanatical· admirer of 
savage life argued that the whites ought to be kept out, he would 
only be driven to the same conclusion by another route, for a 
government on the spot would be necessary to keep them out. 
Accordingly international law has to treat such natives as 
unci vilized. 26 
23. Johnson v. M'Intoch, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
24. LoUIS HENKIN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 149 (3d ed., 1980). 
25. U.S. Foreign ReI. 751,573 (1887), quoted in Id. 
26. John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law 1, 136-145 (1894), cited 
by ANAYA, supra note 6, at 20. 
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If international law, influenced by ethnocentric jurists and publicists, was 
revised so as to accommodate the claims of white settlers, this author 
believes it is of doubtful propriety to assert that the American Indian 
nations were necessarily bound by the revisions. It is a well-accepted 
principle that "a dissenting state which indicates its dissent from a 
practice while the [rule of customary international] law is still in a state 
of development is not bound by the rule of law even after it matures. ,,27 
A problem with international law is, this author believes, the general 
absence of effective enforcement mechanisms and, in the case of early 
American taking of Indian lands, the absence of any international 
tribunals at the time of the wrongs suffered. The enlightened approach 
today is not to pretend that injustice did not occur, but rather to face up to 
the international obligations implicated by these crimes against humanity 
- and to fashion creative remedies designed to seek justice insofar as 
possible, even if it be justice incomplete and long delayed. 
III. INTERNA TIONAL LAW DOCTRINES OF DISCOVERY AND 
CONQUEST WERE APPLIED TO THE INDIAN LANDS UNJUSTLY 
AND DISHONESTLY 
This author submits that the conventional legal wisdom holds, in essence, 
that the Indians were savages who could not understand the concept of 
owning real property. Inasmuch as they did not understand the concept 
of land ownership, the white man reasoned, the Indians could not 
possibly have owned any land. Whites who claimed Indian land could 
thus rationalize that they were taking that which was not previously 
owned by anyone. But a case can be made that the Indians generally 
were more enlightened than the whites who took from them. The 
indigenous people of North America, in fact, had a more highly 
developed sense of responsibility with respect to the land and natural 
resources than the whites who "discovered" it from them. 
Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. explained: 
A concept concerning the right of land ownership, basically 
different from that of the white man, was shared by most 
Indians. To them, land and its produce, like the air and water, 
were free to the use of the group. No man might own land as 
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102, 
comment d, quoted by HENKIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 88 n.l (1993). 
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personal property and bar others from it. A tribe, band or village 
might claim certain land as its territory for farming, hunting, or 
dwelling, but it was held and used communally .... Some tribes, 
moreover, regarded the earth as the mother of all life and thought 
it impossible to sell .... Generally, most Indians had respect, if 
not reverence and awe, for the earth and for all of nature and, 
living close to nature and its forces, strove to exist in balance 
with them.28 
Tecumseh, the great Iroquois chief, informed General William Henry 
Harrison, at Vicennes in August 1810: . "A few chiefs have no right to 
barter away hunting grounds that belong to all Indians .... " Tecumseh 
explained that "all red men have equal right t6 unoccupied land. It 
requires all to make a bargain for all. Until lately, there were no white 
men on this continent. Then, it all belonged to the red men. Once a 
happy race, they have been made miserable by the white men who are 
never contented, but always encroaching. They have driven us from the 
sea-coast, and will shortly push us into the lakes. ,,29 
The Indians came to understand the materialistic values of the white 
man. It was the whites who did not apprehend the spiritual value of the 
land and the concept of shared ownership which was common to the 
Indians. 
Today's system of international law evolved from that which was 
invented by European theorists such as Vitoria. Relying heavily on 
ecclesiastical humanism and fundamental values taught by the Catholic 
Church, these theorists tended to view God as the source of all legitimate 
worldly authority. Historically, the church taught that human beings 
have fundamental rights given by God, rights that may not be taken 
unjustly by others. Founders of international law applied this principle 
of interpersonal morality to the relation between nations. The principle 
was retained even though international law was secularized by its most 
influential author, Hugo Grotius, who cast its norms as a law of nature or 
"dictate of right reason. ,,30 
The Christian church, since its founding by Jesus Christ, espoused the 
Golden Rule and the principles of peace and justice for all people. 
28. Alvin M. Josepby, Jr., The Indian Heritage of America 27 (1991). 
29. Quoted by Irvin M. Pithmann, Broken Peace Pipes: A Four-Hundred-Year History of the 
American Indian 32 (1964). 
30. Hugo Grotius, supra note 10. 
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Ironically, Pope Alexander VI, head of the church and Vicar of Christ, 
purported to grant to Spanish monarchs all lands discovered by their 
agents that were not already ruled by Christian sovereigns?1 But Vitoria, 
citing international law concepts based on traditional Christian precepts, 
taught that the pope lacked power to grant lands already owned by the 
American Indians. 32 Using language similar to that found in papal bulls, 
England's King Henry VII issued a charter which purportedly authorized 
John Cabot to "discover ... countries, regions or provinces of heathens 
and infidels . . . which before this time have been unknown to all 
Christians." Henry VII instructed Cabot to "subdue, occupy and possess" 
such lands, "getting unto us the rule, title, and jurisdiction of the same. ,,33 
King James I issued letters patent in 1609 purporting to "give, grant, and 
confIrm" to Robert, Earl of Salisbury, associates and successors, "the 
lands, countries and territories ... in that part of North America called 
Virginia,,,34 a territory which included the present states of Virginia, 
lllinois and areas in between. The title obtained by the English in virtue 
of the Cabot letters patent passed in 1776 to the newly independent 
United States.35 
A. "INDIAN TITLE" 
A seminal ruling was pronounced in 1823 by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
an lllinois land dispute between defendant, William M'Intosh, who traced 
his title to the Cabot grant, and plaintiffs, devisees of Thomas Johnson, 
who traced his title to the Pinkeshaw Indians.36 Chief Justice Marshall 
- while conceding that the Indian tribes were "independent nations,,37 
before "the whites,,38 arrived and decided "to appropriate" Indian lands,39 
and that the original English claims may indeed have been 
"extravagant,,40 - nevertheless ruled against the validity of the title 
traced to the Indians.41 Marshall reasoned that, because the whites' 
31. Steven T. Newcomb, "The Evidence of Christian Nationalism in Federal Indian Law: The 
Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v. McIntoch. and Plenary Power," XX Rev. of Law and Social 
Change 311. 
32. Francisco de Victoria, supra note 7. 
33. /d. 
34. Johnson v. M1ntosh. supra note 23, at 543. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. 
37. [d. at 574. 
38. [d. at 590. 
39. /d. at 584. 
40. [d. at 591. 
41. [d. at 604-605. 
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claims were over the course of time "sustained,,42 "by the sword,,,43 "the 
actual state of things" required the Supreme Court to apply "a new and 
different rule."44 The Chief Justice wrote that there was some "excuse, if 
not justification" for the European land grab in America because of "the 
character and habits of the people whose nghts have been wrested from 
them. ,,45 The new rule, created for the purpose of justifying Christian 
white-supremacist taking of American Indian lands, was the doctrine of 
discovery and conquest and the correlative notion of "Indian title.,,46 
The doctrine, as set forth by Marshall in Johnson V. M1ntosh, 21 U.S. 
543 (1823), allowed European colonizers - England, Spain, France and 
Holland - to divide up America for their own convenience and gain. 
According to this doctrine, the white nation that "discovered" and 
claimed a particular American territory became its sovereign and holder 
of ultimate title. If uncivilized heathens happened to live there, the 
argument went, they merely had a right of occupancy until they were 
gone - or until their occupancy right was consensually given up, sold 
for consideration or taken by "conquest." The corollary, the native 
inhabitants' right of occupancy, was called "Indian title," not to be 
confused with real title which was held by white supremacists. Further, 
if the Indians were driven away or subjugated by "conquest," i.e., in a 
war the whites considered to be just, then the limited Indian title was 
deemed to be extinguished - and the Indians existed at the mercy of the 
Christian conqueror, who acquired title free of all legal impairments.47 
This author submits that the precept that Indians were incapable of 
understanding and holding any claim to land other than mere occupancy 
was inequitable. It represented an underestimation of the level of culture 
and intellect of American Indian peoples, and a self-serving 
rationalization invented by whites who subscribed to the supremacist 
ideas prevalent among Europeans in the era of discovery. 
According to Chief Justice Marshall in M'intosh, American Indians were 
"warlike ,,48 and "savages, ,,49 whose land rights, other than mere 
occupancy, were "wrested,,50 by the whites' "pompous claims,,51 and 
42. [d. at 591. 
43. [d. at 588. 
44. [d. at 591. 
45. /d. at 589. 
46. [d. at 543. 
47. [d. at 571-605. 
48. [d. at 586. 
49. [d. at 590. 
50. [d. at 589. 
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"superior genius.,,52 The only land interest that a Native American was 
deemed to have the capacity for was the doctrinally limited "Indian right 
of occupancy.,,53 Marshall reasoned that "the rights of the original 
inhabitants ... were necessarily, to a considerable extent, ·impaired," and 
"their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were 
necessarily diminished," just because "discovery gave exclusive title to 
those who made it.,,54 One of the sad ironies of M1ntoch was that it 
purported to rely on "universal recognition" of "principles" of law,55 even 
while it conceded that the "restriction" imposed on Indians' land rights 
"may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized 
nations,,,56 i.e., inconsistent with international law at the time. 
The Indian title concept was summed up in Justice Baldwin's concurring 
opinion in 1830 in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia: 
While the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the 
natives as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be 
in themselves; and claimed and exercised as a consequence of . 
this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil while yet in the 
possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by 
all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian 
rights of occupancy. 57 
B. DISCOVERY THEORY 
As we have seen, apologists for European kings' grants of American 
Indian lands to colonizers rationalized that the aboriginal "savages" could 
not truly own land because mentally they could not grasp the concept of 
land ownership. Concededly, the Native Americans had different ideas 
about land rights than the Europeans, but it does not necessarily follow 
that the Indians had inferior understanding or inferior rights. John 
Winthrop said Indians (who moved farms and villages periodically) were 
capable of mere occupancy, not true possession of land, because they 
lacked enclosed habitations and permanent cultivation.58 The Europeans 
had the idea that a person can have exclusive rights to land or, 
51. Id. at 590. 
52. ld. at 673. 
53. ld. at 574. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. 
56. /d. at 591. 
57. Cherokee Nation, supra note 11, at 48. 
58. Class notes in author's possession: Andrew Lichterman, Real Property Law lecture, John 
F. Kennedy University School of Law (Walnut Creek, Calif., August 28, 1995). 
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alternatively, can be the owner of title to land temporarily occupied or 
physiCally possessed by someone else. The Indians tended to believe . 
that the land and its resources were provided by the Almighty for people 
to share on a reasonable basis according to their needs. In the wide open 
spaces of America, where many tribes were hunters or migratory, this 
concept made a lot of sense. It did not, by any stretch of logic or 
fairness, give newly arrived European settlers the right to assert that they 
were the true owners of title to the land where Indians had lived since 
time immemorial. 
It was a fundamentally wrong-headed argument that the Indians could 
not own land because they did not understand or claim absolute title or 
fee interest. It is well understood, even in common law, that no title 
entails totally absolute rights. No person, no owner, not even the state 
has an unlimited right to despoil natural resources to the detriment of 
neighbors or future generations. It is particularly ironic that popes, 
potentates and plenipotentiaries who claimed to be guided by Christian 
principles would rely on the difference between Indian and European 
property theories as a justification for Europeans unilaterally to claim 
title to Indian lands. The Catholic church itself (one of the largest 
landowners in the world) teaches respect for the conscientious religious 
convictions of all people;59 but of course there have been episodes 
throughout church history when clerics or even popes - while calling 
aborigines "infidels" - have themselves deviated from such teachings. 
In doctrine traced to Scripture, the church also teaches the idea that the 
gifts of the earth are provided by God, that human beings are the 
stewards of the natural world, that we all have a moral duty to respect the 
rights of not only our neighbors today but also generations to come in the 
future.6o The Christian idea of human stewardship of the earth can be 
analogized to the Native American idea of responsibility for sharing the 
earth and protecting its blessings for posterity. It is therefore especially 
ironic that Europeans would so twist the system of international law, 
derived from Christian humanism, so distort it to allow settlers and 
colonists to steal America from the Indians. 
59. Declaration of Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) ch. I, in Walter M. Abbott, S.1., 
ed., Very Rev. Msgr. Joseph Gallagher, trans. ed., The Documents of Vatican II (1966),681: 
"On his part, man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through 
the mediation of conscience. In all his activity a man is bound to follow his conscience faithfully, in 
order that he may come to God, for whom he was created. It follows that he is not to be forced to act 
in a manner contrary to his conscience. Nor, on the other hand, is he to be restrained from acting in 
accordance with his conscience, especially in matters religious." 
60. Genesis, 2:20-26. 
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Grotius disapproved of the notion that discovery of inhabited land 
confers title on the discoverer, "even though the occupant may be 
wicked, may hold wrong views about God, or may be dull of wit. For 
discovery applies to those things which belong to no one. ,,61 
According to international law, the discoverer's claim would not be valid 
unless subsequently consummated by actual occupation of the land by 
the discoverer's people. Max Huber, arbitrating a dispute between the 
Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, pointed out that, according to the 
view that has prevailed at any rate since the nineteenth century, an 
inchoate title of discovery must be completed within a reasonable period 
by the effective occupation of the region claimed to be discovered.62 
The illegitimacy of the doctrine of discovery as applied to Native 
Americans was effectively conceded by Joseph Story, nineteenth century 
U.S. Supreme Court justice, who insisted, nonetheless, that the 
entitlements based on the doctrine must be permanently accepted merely 
because they were accepted. In Story's circular line of reasoning: 
The Truth is, that the European nations paid not the slightest 
regard to the rights of the native tribes. They treated them as 
mere barbarians and heathens, whom, if they were not at liberty 
to extirpate, they were entitled to deem mere temporary 
occupants of the soil .... The right of discovery, thus asserted, 
has become the settled foundation, on which the European 
nations rest their title to territory in America; and it is a right 
which, under our governments, must now be deemed 
incontestable, however doubtful in its origin, or unsatisfactory in 
its principles. The Indians . . . have been deemed to be the 
lawful occupants of the soil, and entitled to a temporary 
possession thereof, subject to the superior sovereignty of the 
particular European nation, which actually held the title of 
discovery.63 
It is a repugnant implication of Justice Story's logic that the victims of a 
crime against humanity may claim no remedy for the reason that they did 
not receive a remedy. 
61. Hugo Grotius, supra note 10, at 550. 
62. Island of Palmas Case, 2 U.N. Rep. Int1 Arb. Awards 829 (1928), in Henkin et ai, 
International Law, supra note 24, at 309. 
63. Joseph Story, A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States 13-14 
(1859), quoted by Steven T. Newcomb, supra note 23, at 316-317 n. 84. 
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The Cabot charter, noted above, purported to give an English discoverer 
an absolute right to subdue the Indians and to seize and possess their 
lands, in derogation of all indigenous rights and claims. But 
international law does not allow settlers to treat native peoples as if they 
do not exist. The International Court of Justice, holding that the Western 
Sahara was not terra nullius (i.e., holding that it was not territory 
belonging to no one) when it had been colonized by Spain in 1884, 
reported: 
State practice of the relevant period indicates that territories 
inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political 
organization were not regarded as terra nullius. It shows that in 
the case of such territories the acquisition of sovereignty was not 
generally considered as effected unilaterally through 
'occupation' ... but through agreements concluded with local 
rulers.64 
C. CONQUEST THEORY 
The theory of discovery allowed whites to rationalize taking title to 
Indian lands even when they recognized the natives' right to (at least 
temporarily) be on the land which the settlers now claimed they owned. 
In the alternative, the theory of conquest enabled the white colonies, and 
subsequently United States authorities, to assert that they owned the land 
outright and could expel the Indians practically at will. The idea was 
that, if the white man fought a just war against the Indians and won, the 
white man got the spoils of war, the rights of conque~t, the title in fee 
simple to the land. The problem is that this conquest theory was 
frequently asserted following savage military actions in which there was 
nothing just about the white man's cause. Grotius' international law 
theory of just war, derived from ancient church fathers, did not sanction 
conquest by aggressive war; this fact, however, did nothing to slow the 
white man's conquest of Native American lands. 
Emmerich de Vettel, an eighteenth century authority on international 
law, denounced the white settlers' conquest of Native American lands. 
He. said Europeans who "attacked the American Nations and subjected 
them to their avaricious rule, in order, as they have said, to civilize them, 
64. Western Sahara Case, 1975 I.e.J. 12, 39, quoted by Gordon Bennett, Aboriginal Rights 
in International Law 5 (1978). 
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and have them instructed in the true religion - those usurpers, I say, 
justified themselves by a pretext equally inputs and ridiculous. ,,65 
The armed conquest of Native American lands, attended by the 
decimation of tribal populations, was a manifestation of not only material 
greed but also ethnic hate. White warriors who massacred Indians 
generally did not dissent from the widespread slaughters. Doubtless they 
approved because of their conception that the Indians were inferior 
savages. The killers were not merely Indian haters; they were believers 
in a form of exterminationist racism.66 
D. No REMEDY IN THE CHEROKEE CASES 
Eight years after Marshall propounded the "Indian title" rationalizations 
in M'Intosh, he announced in Cherokee Nation67 that an individual state, 
unlike the United States, could not assert any sovereignty over Indian 
lands. The decision in Cherokee Nation reaffirmed the doctrine of 
discovery, but made clear that unconquered Indian tribes nevertheless 
had not yet lost all of the attributes of sovereign nations and were in fact 
supposed to be protected by federal authority against any incursions or 
claims by states. The decision was occasioned by the Cherokees' 
challenge to statutes Georgia enacted in 1828 which purported to annex 
the lands of the Cherokee Nation into five Georgia counties, voided 
Indian contracts, provided guards for gold mines recently discovered in 
Cherokee lands; and authorized the governor to take possession of gold, 
silver and other mines. 
Marshall noted in Cherokee Nation that federal and Georgia authorities 
in 1802 agreed that the U.S. government would "extinguish" the 
Cherokees' title "so soon only as it could be done peaceably and on 
reasonable terms," and that in the meantime all would respect "the Indian 
boundary as arranged by the treaties" and "the sovereignty of the Indians, 
and of their exclusive right to give and to execute the law within that 
boundary." Marshall also noted that "presidents Monroe and Adams, in 
succession ... avowed their determination to protect these complainants 
65. Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or The Principles of Natural Law, Charles G. 
Fenwick trans. of 1758 ed. Jl6 (1916). 
66. Cf Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust 416 (1996): "That the perpetrators approved of the mass slaughter, that they willingly 
gave assent to their own participation in the slaughter, is certain. That their approval derived in the 
main from their own conception of Jews is aJl but certain, for no other source of motivation can 
plausibly account for their actions." 
67. Cherokee Nation. supra note II. 
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[the Cherokee Indians] by force if necessary, and to fulfil the guarantee 
given to them by the treaties." The state of Georgia noted, though, that 
President Andrew Jackson asserted that he had no power to protect the 
Indians against the laws of Georgia.68 
Marshall wrote in Cherokee Nation that the congressional act of 1830 
provided for exchange of lands with the Indians and for their removal 
west of the Mississippi, that it "is to apply to such Indians as may choose 
to remove, and . . . nothing contained in the act shall be construed as 
authorising or directing the violation of any existing treaty between the 
United States and any of the Indian tribes.'.69 The Chief Justice, who had 
overestimated the savagery of the Indians in his M1ntosh analysis, now 
underestimated the savagery of the federal authorities under President 
Jackson. According to Marshall's line of reasoning, it did not even 
matter that treaties had given titles in fee simple 70 to the Cherokees. 
The Cherokee Nation decision recounted forgotten reality: 
A people once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found 
by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an 
ample domain ... have yielded the lands by successive treaties . 
. . until they retain no more of their formerly extensive territory 
than is deemed necessary to their comfortable subsistence.7! 
Marshall's opinion for the court did not reach the question of whether the 
acts of the Georgia legislature, purporting to take Cherokee land and 
rights, were violative of the U.S. Constitution. While noting that "the 
Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, 
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy,,,n and indicating that the 
decision would be for the Cherokees if the "courts were permitted to 
indulge their sympathies,'073 Marshall concluded that the court lacked 
jurisdiction. Asserting that the tribe is neither a "foreign nation" nor a 
state, Marshall reasoned that the courts could not hear the Cherokees' 
case.74 Thus, although Georgia acted unconstitutionally to deprive the 
Cherokees of land and rights, the federal jurists took the position that no 
judicial remedy could be obtained. Marshall's 1831 opinion denied the 
68. [d. at 7-10. 
69. [d. at 9. 
70. See MLean dissent in Worcester. supra note 12 at 587. 
71. Cherokee Nation. supra note 11. at 15. 
72. ld. at 17. 
73. /d. at 15. 
74. [d. at 15-17. 
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Cherokees' request for an injunction and concluded, ominously: "If it be 
true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be 
apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent 
the future.,,75 
The racialist views that existed at the time were revealed in the 
concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in Cherokee Nation: 
"Independently of the general influence of humanity, these people were 
restless, warlike, and signally cruel . . . and it was probably wise to 
prepare them . . . to incorporate them in time into our respective 
governments: a policy which their inveterate habits and deep seated 
enmity has altogether baffled."76 
But the proposition that the Cherokees were not a foreign nation was 
refuted by the eloquent dissent of Justice Thompson: 
The circumstance of their original occupancy is here referred to, 
merely for the purpose of showing, that if these Indian 
communities were then, as they certainly were, nations, they 
must have been foreign nations, to all the world; not having any 
connection, or ~liance of any description, with any other power 
on earth. And if the Cherokees were then a foreign nation; when 
or how have they lost that character, and ceased to be a distinct 
people, and become incorporated with any other community? 
They have never been, by conquest, reduced to the situation of 
subjects to any conqueror, and thereby lost their separate 
national existence, and the rights of self government, and 
become subject to the laws of the conqueror. When ever wars 
have taken place, they have been followed by regular treaties of 
peace, containing stipulations on each side according to existing 
circumstances; the Indian nation always preserving its distinct 
and separate national character. And ... the right of occupancy 
is still admitted to remain in them, accompanied by the right of 
self government, according to their own usages and customs; and 
with the competency to act in a national capacity, although 
placed under the protection of the whites, and owing a qualified 
subjection so far as is requisite for public safety. But the 
principle is universally admitted, that this occupancy belongs to 
them as a matter of right, and not by mere indulgence. They 
75. [d. at 20. 
76. /d. at 23-24. 
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cannot be disturbed in the enjoyment of it, or deprived of it, 
without their free consent; or unless a just and necessary war 
should sanction their dispossession.77 
The inverse of the doctrine of "Indian title" would be the conception that 
. it was white settlers who became mere occupants on what was rightfully 
the Indians' land. Then "white title" would be the colonists', somewhat 
analogous to the Cold War claims of Kremlin agents in far-flung vassal 
"republics" of the old Soviet Union. 
According to Henkin, a state does not cease to be a state because it is 
occupied by a foreign power . . .. Thus, Kuwait remained a state 
notwithstanding its occupation and putative annexation by Iraq in 1990. 
The United States never recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania into the U.S.S.R.78 
. Marshall in Cherokee Nation acknowledged: 
It is the political relation in which one government or country 
stands to another, which constitutes it foreign to the other. The 
Cherokee territory being within the chartered li!llits of Georgia, 
does not affect the question .... [1]t is not perceived that any 
absurdity or inconsistency grows out of the circumstance, that 
the jurisdiction and territory of the state of Georgia surround or 
extend on every side of the Cherokee territory. It may be 
inconvenient to the state, and very desirable, that the Cherokees 
should be removed; but it does not at all affect the political 
relation between· Georgia and those Indians. Suppose the 
Cherokee territory had been occupied by Spaniards or any other 
civilized people, instead of Indians, and they had from time to 
time ceded to the United States portions of their lands precisely 
in the same manner as the Indians have done, and in like manner 
retained and occupied the part now held by the Cherokees, and 
having a regular government established there: would it not only 
be considered a separate and distinct nation or state, but a foreign 
nation, with reference to the state of Georgia or the United 
States. If we look to lexicographers, as well as approved writers, 
77. Id. at 54-55. 
78. 2 FOREIGN POL'y BULL 33, no. 2 (Sept./Oct. 1911). 
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for the use of the term foreign, it may be applied with the 
strictest propriety to the Cherokee nation.79 
195 
Justice Thompson's Cherokee Nation dissent noted that the sovereignty 
of Indian nations was persuasively explained by Chancellor Kent in a 
New York case, Jackson v. Goodel, 20 Johns. 193, where the citizenship 
of an Oneida Indian was at issue: 
That Oneidas, he observed, and the tribes composing the six 
nations of Indians, were originally free and independent nations, 
and it is for the counsel who contend that they have now ceased 
to be a distinct people and become completely incorporated with 
us, to point out the time when that event took place . . .. Still 
they are permitted to exist as distinct nations, and we continue to 
treat with their sachems in a national capacity, and as being the 
lawful representatives of their tribes . . .. No argument can be 
drawn against the sovereignty of these Indian nations, from the 
fact of their having put themselves and their lands under the 
protection of the British crown: such a fact is a frequent 
occurrence between independent nations. One community may 
be bound to another by a very unequal alliance, and still be a 
sovereign state. Vat. B. 1, ch. 16, section 194.80 
The year after the Marshall court denied the Cherokees' request for an 
injunction barring Georgia from enforcing the state's anti-Indian statutes, 
it used another case to strike down the same statutes as repugnant to the 
U.S. Constitution. Although the high court had found in Cherokee 
Nation that the Indians lacked standing to sue in federal court, it found in 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), that a Christian missionary 
from Vermont, convicted on a state charge of being on Cherokee land 
without a state license, did have standing. In Worcester, the court 
reaffIrmed the Mlntosh "Indian title" theory of diminished Native 
American land rights, but it held unconstitutional the far-reaching 
Georgia statutes that took the property and liberty of Cherokee people. 
However, the announcement of the decision in Worcester, though 
initially celebrated as a victory for justice,8! was not followed by redress 
of grievances. On the contrary, the decision was ignored not only by the 
states but also by the political branches of the federal government. The 
79. Cherokee Nation, supra note 11, at 55-56. 
80. Quoted by Thompson, dissent, in Cherokee Nation, supra note 8, at 67-68. 
81. See William Brandon, Indians 238-239 (1961). 
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high court had no army to enforce its will. And the atrocities escalated 
across the United States, as willing executioners unleashed by Andrew 
Jackson waged a genocidal campaign that was to take the lands and lives 
of Indian people. 
Author William C. Canby, Jr. wrote in 1988: 
President Jackson probably did not make the statement about the 
decision that is popularly attributed to him: 'John Marshall has 
made his decision; now let him enforce it,' but there is little 
question that the decision was not popular w.ith the Jacksonians 
who were anxious to hasten the exodus of the tribes from lands 
east of the Mississippi. In the end, however, those favoring 
removal had their way. All but a few remnants of tribes east of 
the Mississippi were moved to the West under a program that 
was voluntary in name and coerced in fact. The journeys were 
often attended with extreme hardship and some became virtual 
symbols of imposed suffering, such as the Trail of Tears by the 
Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw 
and Seminole) from the Southeast to what is now Oklahoma.82 
The genocidal policy continued for the greater part of the nineteenth 
century. A famed general stated that exterminating the Indians was the 
only way to keep them from becoming government-supported paupers;83 
the inhumanity of the statement attributed to General William Tecumseh 
Sherman was an ironic affront to his own name, but it reflected the 
violent racism of the era. 
E. MIXED RESULTS IN LATER CASES 
Indians' land rights had been devastated by the M'Intosh theories of 
"Indian title," discovery, and conquest. Native rights were further eroded 
in 1903 when the Supreme Court decided Congress had "plenary power" 
to take the lands and evict the Indians without compensation. In Lone 
Wolf V. Hitchcock,84 the high court upheld the taking of two million acres 
of Apache, Comanche and Kiowa lands in Oklahoma, even though the 
record showed the takings were the product of years of fraud and 
misrepresentation by agents of the United States. The taking was lawful, 
the high court found, because it was approved by Congress, whose power 
82. William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell 16-17 (1988). 
83. CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY, INDIAN FIGHTS AND FIGHTERS II (1971). 
84. Lane Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553. 
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to take from the Indians is unbridled. The court's Lone Wolf decision 
conceded that, in M1ntosh and its progeny, "the Indian right of 
occupancy ... has been stated to be ... as sacred as the fee of the United 
States in the same lands." But it distinguished Lone Wolf because "in 
none of those cases was there involved a controversy between Indians 
and the government respecting the power of Congress to administer the 
property of the Indians." The power to administer, according to the Lone 
Wolf theory, is the power to annihilate. 
The high court in Lone Wolf said it "presumed" that Congress, in 
exercising this unlimited power over Indians, "would be governed by 
such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people in their 
treatment of an ignorant and dependent race." It is ironic that 
Christianity was evoked by the discoverers who took Indian land, and by 
the fIrst Supreme Court which sanctioned the early, incomplete takings, 
and then was attributed to the Congress which consummated a plenary 
power to take without any need to compensate or justify. "Be that as it 
may," the court said in Lone Wolf, "the propriety or justice of their action 
towards the Indians with respect to their lands is a question of 
governmental policy . . .. Plenary authority over the tribal relations of 
the Indians has been ... political ... not subject to be controlled by the 
judicial department of the government." Congress, the court added, is 
just as free to trample Indian rights as it is to violate treaties with foreign 
nations.85 The Lone Wolf decision did not address due process, the 
Takings clause, or the international obligations of the United States. 
A new and different outcome occurred in a 1946 Supreme Court decision 
that required compensation for lands taken from Indian tribes in Oregon. 
In United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks,86 the court decided that, 
although the federal taking itself was a nonjusticiable political question, 
there was nonetheless a cause of action arising from the involuntary 
taking of lands held by original Indian title. Without referring to the 
Takings clause, the high court said that "taking original Indian title 
without compensation and without consent does not satisfy the high 
standards for fair dealing' required of the United States in controlling 
Indian affairs. United States v. Santa Fe R. Co., 1941, 314 U.S. 339, 
356,,87 Dissenting, Justice Reed, joined by Justices Rutledge and Burton, 
saw peril, opening floodgates to litigation: "It is diffIcult to foresee the 
result of this ruling in the consideration of claims by Indian tribes against 
85. Id. at 564-566. 
86. United States v. Alcea Band ofTillamooks, 329 U.S. 40. 
87. Id. at 46-47. 
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the United States. We do not know the amount of land so taken. West of 
the Mississippi it must be large .... [C]harges of unfair dealings may 
open up to consideration again legal or equitable claims for taking 
aboriginal lands. ,,88 
Consequently, Indian real property claims generally are at the mercy of 
Congress, subject to a fairness standard that may depend on the degree of 
deference the Supreme Court decides to show to the legislative branch in 
a particular case. 
IV. THE TAKING OF THE CONTINENT VIOLATED BINDING 
TREATIES, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 
The Constitution places the power to make treaties in the president and 
the senate,89 and authorizes the judicial branch to decide cases arising 
under treaties.9o Congress in 1'871, during a period of violent anti-Indian 
sentiment, enacted a statute which said no Indian tribe could any longer 
be recognized as an independent nation with which the United States 
could enter into a treaty, but that existing treaties would not be affected; 
that law, 25 U.S.C.A. section 71, is still on the books. 
That the Constitution's Treaty clause was meant to recognize the 
sovereign nationhood of Indian tribes is demonstrated, in this author's 
view, by the fact that the contemporaries of the Framers, those who were 
involved directly or indirectly in the process of ratification, understood it 
to be so. To be sure, the American Constitution is dynamic and its 
application must adapt to the needs of changing times. But the true 
meaning of its fundamental concepts is better discerned from the 
understanding of the ratifiers than from the memory lapses of jurists and 
lawmakers a century or two later. 91 
88. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-289 (1955). 
89. U.S. Const. II, 2. 
90. U.S. Const. m, 2(1). 
91. Jack N. Rakove wrote in Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the 
Constitution 8-9 (1996): "Meaning must be derived from usage, however ... altemative formulations 
of original intention and understanding become pertinent. Intention connotes purpose and 
forethought.... Understanding, by contrast, may be used more broadly to cover the impressions and 
interpretations of the Constitution formed by its original readers - the citizens, polemicists, and 
convention delegates who participated in one way or another in its ratification. .... The Constitution 
derives its supremacy, in other words, from a direct expression of popular sovereignty, superior in 
authority to all subsequent legal acts resting only on the weaker foundations of representation. " 
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The Treaty clause provides that the president "shall have power, by and 
with the advice and consent of the senate to make treaties, provided two 
thirds of the senators present concur. ,,92 The clause does not distinguish 
treaties made with Indian nations from treaties made with any other 
categories of nations. Therefore, the fact that the Framers and ratifiers of 
the Constitution understood the clause to apply to Indian nations exactly 
the same as it applied to other nations is demonstrated by the consistent 
practice of the young United States, in the early decades of our national 
existence, of: (a) negotiating treaties with long-established Indian 
nations, and (b) ratifying the pacts by a two-thirds vote of the senate in 
exactly the same manner as was followed in respect $0 treaties with non-
Indian nations such as England and France. 
Justice Thompson's Cherokee Nation dissent pointed to the Hopewell 
treaty of 1785 as but one illustration of the U.S. practice of concluding 
treaties with the Indians. That treaty settled boundary lines between the 
Cherokee Nation and the United States, and provided, inter alia, for 
prisoner exchanges and the extradition of fugitives. Thompson asked, 
"What more explicit recognition of the sovereignty and independence of 
this nation could have been made? It was a direct acknowledgement, 
that the territory was under a foreign jurisdiction." And he noted that 
provisions of Indian treaties were the same as provisions in treaties with 
non-Indian nations including, England.93 Similarly, Chief Justice 
Marshall in Worcester cited the Holston treaty of 1791 as an 
international agreement between the United States and the Cherokees: 
"This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection 
of one more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national 
character, and submitting its subjects to the laws of a master.,,94 
As Justice MLean wrote, concurring in the 1832 Worcester decision, 
"After a lapse of more than forty years since treaties with the Indians 
have been solemnly ratified by the general government, it is too late to 
deny their binding force. ,,95 
A. LAW OF NATIONS AND SUPREMACY CLAUSES VIOLATED 
The Constitution recognizes the law of nations, for it expressly 
empowers Congress to define and punish offenses against it. 96 Ever 
92. U.s. Cons!. II, 2(1). 
93. Cherokee Nation, supra note 11, at 61. 
94. Worcester, supra note 12, at 555. 
95. [d. at 583. 
96. U.S. Const. I, 8(3). 
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since the founding of the United States, federal and state courts have 
always treated customary international law as incorporated into U.S. law. 
International law passed on from the law of England to the American 
colonies and thence to the United States. U.S. law, which includes our 
Constitution and treaties, is the supreme law of the land.97 
Prior to the voyage of Christopher Columbus, Indian nations were, as 
discussed above, sovereign states equal in status to any other states in 
the world under international law. But Indian sovereignty was ravaged 
in practice by papal bulls, royal charters, colonial aggressions and later, 
by corrosive U.S. Supreme Court decisions and anti-Indian policies of 
the states and the political branches of the federal government. 
Hence, this author believes the conclusion is inescapable that the 
American Indian lands were taken unjustly, in violation of norms of law 
and morality. The law was manipulated to make it all ultimately legal. 
But in the name of humanity we must recognize the truth, that we live on 
their land. 
Marshall, in Worcester, addressed the Supremacy clause 10 its 
application to Indian treaties: 
The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as 
those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted 
and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and 
consequently admits their rank among those powers who are 
capable of making treaties. The words 'treaty' and 'nation' are 
words of our own language, having each a definite and well 
understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we 
have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are 
applied to all in the samesense.98 
B. COMMERCE CLAUSE VIOLATED 
Marshall's dicta in Cherokee Nation discussed whether the Commerce 
clause, empowering Congress to "regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes,,,99 
indicates whether the tribes were deemed to be nations. He concluded: 
"The court has bestowed its best attention on this question, and, after 
97. U.S. Const. VI, 2. 
98. Worcester, supra note 12, at 559-560. 
99. U.S. Const. III, 8. 
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mature deliberation, the majority is of the opinion that an Indian tribe or 
nation within the United States is not a foreign state in the sense of the 
constitution, and cannot maintain an action in the courts of the United 
States.,,100 But this reading of the commerce clause did not take into 
account the practice of the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution, who 
consistently treated the Indian tribes as foreign nations. Nor did it 
consider the fact that the Framers and ratifiers would not have intended 
to deny their Indian friends all access to the federal court system. 
Further, it did not address how the Framers, whether intending to do so 
or not, could have taken away, by a stroke of the pen, the previously 
acknowledged sovereignty of independent nations of Indians. 
c. TAKINGS CLAUSE VIOLATED 
The Takings clause of the Fifth Amendment bars governmental taking of 
private property for public use without just compensation. 101 As we have 
seen, the Supreme Court has not paid attention to the Takings clause in 
cases involving the public taking of Indian lands. lo2 Instead, the court 
has sometimes applied a more vague concept that some compensation is 
required by the congressional duty of fair dealing with the Indian tribes. 
But a logical case can be made that the Takings clause standard should 
be applied when the government in fact has taken Native American lands 
for public purposes. After all, there is nothing in the Constitution to 
suggest that Indians are so inferior as to be inherently denied the 
protection promised by the Takings clause to all owners of private 
property. 
D. CONTRACTS CLAUSE 
The Contracts clauselO3 prohibits state impairment of contracts. It does 
not appear to have direct application to Indian tribes, which are held to 
be constitutionally immune from state regulation and subject only to 
federal law. Ironically, though, the first Contracts clause case heard by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), 
laid the groundwork for the M1ntosh line of cases that gave a 
constitutional excuse for the taking of Native American lands. Fletcher 
sought to annul Georgia's conveyance of land to Peck's predecessors in 
interest. Fletcher argued that a royal proclamation in 1763 had 
100. Cherokee Nation, supra note 11, at 20. 
101. U.S. Const., Amendment V. 
102 . United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, supra note 85. 
103. U.S. Const. I, 10(1). 
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confirmed Indian tribes' full title in that land, with the result that the state 
could not later convey it. The high court ruled for Peck on the issue. 
Chief Justice John Marshall, finding that the tribes held only a limited 
interest, wrote for the high court: "[T]he Indian title which is certainly to 
be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately extinguished, is not ... 
absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state. ,,104 Laurence 
Tribe has noted that the Fletcher decision, a characteristic Marshall 
compromise, "set the course" for Marshall's later decisions denying that 
Indians could have full ownership of their land.105 The term Indian title 
was introduced to signify a kind of limited title, a right of possession or 
occupancy that was expected, in due time, to be extinguished. 
E. FIFrH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
Literature and jurisprudence derived from the Due Process clause are 
very extensive. But there is little or no attention devoted to due process 
in major Supreme Court cases involving the taking of Native American 
property. The clause in the Fifth Amendment expressly provides, "No 
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.,,106 The substantive and procedural due process 
protections provided to American Indians should be no less than those 
assured to all persons by the Constitution. 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: NEW U.S. 
POLICIES SHOULD HONOR THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND RE-
STORE THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIANS 
The taking of America involved the most extensive land fraud and the 
largest holocaust in world history. Chief Justice John Marshall used 
international law doctrines of discovery and conquest to rationalize white 
supremacist usurpation of Indian nation sovereignty, even while 
conceding that the great injustice may have violated international law 
principles. Later Supreme Court decisions and policies of the political 
branches further ravaged Native Americans' land rights. The Framers of 
the Constitution had been profoundly inspired by their many Indian 
friends, but in the Jackson era federal troops and ragtag racists ran 
roughshod over the Indians, their land and the law. The vast frauds and 
atrocities were committed by avowed Christians in the name of a religion 
104. Fletcherv. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,142·143 (1810). 
105. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 466 (1978). 
106. U.S. Const., Amendment V. 
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that unequivocally condemns stealing and violence. Now the surviving 
remnants of Native American tribes are the most neglected and 
mistreated ethnic group. Now creative remedies can be fashioned to 
restore honor to Indian nations and to the United States of America. 
Today some 1.5 million Native Americans live on 300 reservations 
covering more than 52 million acres in 27 states. I07 They have the worst 
poverty levels - and shortest life expectancies - of any ethnic group 
in the United States; 108 the toll of the American holocaust, thus 
continuing still, must end. 
As we have seen, early decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced 
by Chief Justice John Marshall lamented the injustices done to the Native 
American Indians and the legally questionable means by which land 
rights were wrested from them. Marshall's rationalizations were 
followed by generations of court decisions, executive orders, acts of 
Congress, army expeditions and mob acts of avarice and violence that 
left almost all the Native Americans dead and almost all their property in 
white hands. Throughout U.S. history, elected officials have proclaimed 
policies of fairness and protection toward the Indians who, in the course 
of it all, have lost their sovereignty, their rights and their sacred lands. 
Jurists and politicians have been aware of the tragic betrayals, but have 
never felt they had the capacity to act to bring justice to Indian people. 
With the dawn of a new millenium, it is high time for America to take 
specific, practical steps to make up, so far as can be done now, for some 
of the unspeakable harm that has been wrought against the Indians, on 
whose land we live. 
The federal district judge who decided the Wounded Knee Cases109 in 
1975 found that he was unable to dismiss criminal charges against 
approximately 65 Indians who were prosecuted in connection with 
events that allegedly took place on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, 
South Dakota. But he used his opinion in those consolidated cases to 
proclaim that the injustices done to Native Americans are of such vast 
and historic proportions that they are beyond the scope of competency of 
the federal judiciary. While deciding that the Sioux treaty of 1868 did 
not protect these defendants from federal prosecution, Chief Judge Urbon 
107. Susan Lope, Indian Giver: The Illusion of Effective Legal Redress for Native American 
Land Claims, 23 S. W. U. L Rev. 331, 358-359 (1994). 
108. Steven L. Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes, an ACLU handbook, 2d ed. 1 (1992). 
109. United States v. Consolidated Wounded Knee Cases, 389 F.Supp. 235. Indian defendants 
were charged criminally with acts alleged to have occurred on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation 
near Wounded Knee, S.D. in 1973. 
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cried out for the American people and their elected leaders to wake up 
and finally do something about the way the Indians have been treated. 
The chief judge wrote: 
The Sioux people were once a fully sovereign nation. They are 
not now and have not been for a long time. Whether they ever 
will be again is dependent upon actions of the Congress and the 
President of the United States and not of the courts. There is a 
residue of sovereignty, however. . .. It cannot be denied that 
official policy of the United States until at least the late 19th 
century was impelled by a resolute will to control substantial 
territory for its westward-moving people. Whatever obstructed 
the movement, including the Indians, was to be - and was -
shoved aside, dominated, or destroyed. Wars, disease, treaties 
pocked by duplicity, and decimation of the buffalo by whites 
drove the Sioux to reservations, shriveled their population and 
disemboweled their corporate body. They were left a people 
unwillingly dependent in fact upon the United States. 
It is an ugly history. White Americans may retch at the 
recollection of it. 
They may also ask themselves questions: How much of the sins 
of our fore-fathers must we rightly bear? What precisely do we 
do now? Shall we pretend that history never was? Can we 
restore the disemboweled or push the waters of the river 
upstream to where they used to be? 
Who is to decide? White Americans? The Native Americans? 
All, together? A federal judge? 
Who speaks for the Sioux? Those traditional people who 
testified here? Those Sioux of a different mind who did not 
testify? The officials elected by the Sioux on the eight 
reservations? 
Feeling what was wrong does not describe what is right. 
Anguish about yesterday does not alone make wise answers for 
tomorrow. Somehow, all the achings of the soul must coalesce 
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and with the wisdom of the mind develop a single national 
policy for governmental action. 11O 
205 
Judge Urbom observed that (a) elected officials are "more likely to 
reflect the conscience and wisdom of the people" than appointed judges; 
(b) Congress has investigative tools which the courts lack; (c) "relations 
with American Indians are rooted in international relations," an arena 
better suited to the political branches; and (d) the Constitution has placed 
relations with Indian tribes in the province of presidential and 
congressional power. II I Noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had reduced 
the sovereignty of the Indian nations, Judge Urbom said: "When the 
Supreme Court speaks clearly, I must honor the statement or be as 
unfaithful to my duty to the law as the United States has been to its 
promises to the American Indians." He also expressed his hope that the 
Wounded Knee hearing would "serve to make the citizenry of the United 
States more aware and more willing to grapple with the hard decisions 
that need to be made.,,112 
A. RENEWAL OF NATIONHOOD 
Justice would be served if Indian nationhood could be restored and 
Indians allowed the opportunity to make real the dream of Crazy Horse: 
"We would live as our fathers did, and their fathers before them.,,113 
The numerosity argument against Indian nationhood - that it would be 
troublesome to have to treat each tribe as a nation because there are too 
many of them - was presented by the concurring opinions of Justices 
Johnson and Baldwin in Cherokee Nation. Johnson wrote: "Where is 
the rule to stop? Must every petty kraal of Indians, designating 
themselves a tribe or nation, and having a few hundred acres of land to 
hunt on exclusively, be recognized as a state? We should indeed force 
into the family of nations, a very numerous and very heterogeneous 
progeny.'.114 Baldwin feared that "if one is a foreign nation or state, all 
others in like condition must be so ... and each of their subjects capable 
of suing in the circuit courts. This case then is the case of countless 
tribes, who ... as states or aliens, will rush to the federal courts in endless 
controversies, growing out of the laws of states or congress.,,1l5 The 
110. Id. at 236,238-239. 
Ill. Id. at 239-240. 
112. Id. at 240. 
1l3. Quoted by Peter Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse ix (1972). 
114. Cherokee Nation, supra note II, at 25. 
115. Id. at 32. 
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inequity of the Cherokee Nation decision, denying a federal injunction 
for want of jurisdiction where Georgia by force of arms stole Indian land 
and gold, is an historic fact. So is the later act of Congress that gave 
Indians the right to sue in federal courts, a reform whose happy exercise 
has refuted Justice Baldwin's fear of floodgates open to an unmanageable 
volume of Indian litigation. 
Steven Paul McSloy asked whether the self-determination principles that 
allow sovereignty and United Nations membership to Saint Kitts and 
Nevis (139 square miles, 54,775 people), Liechtenstein (62 square miles, 
27,074 people), and San Marino (23 square miles, 22,791 people), to 
name just a few, should apply to the Navajo (166,000 people), the 
Lumbee (50,000 people), the Cherokee (42,992 people) ... and other 
Indian peoples, who in the aggregate still own 52,500,000 acres of land 
in the contiguous United States, an additional 44,000,000 acres in 
Alaska, and potentially millions of additional acres presently the subject 
of land claim litigation. 116 
The present author recommends that a practical solution to the 
numerosity problem would be to form agreements whereby the larger 
Native American Indian nations would have the opportunity to be seated 
in the United Nations, while smaller ones could join together, if they 
wished, in confederations, which could be seated in the world 
organization. But the fact that a state is small should not necessarily 
exclude it from admission to the family of nations. 
Justice Johnson also presented the circular argument that the Cherokee 
Nation could not be recognized as a nation because it lacked power to 
sell or transfer its land without the consent of the United States. He 
compared the Cherokees to small European nations: "They have in 
Europe sovereign and semi-sovereign states and states of doubtful 
sovereignty. But this state, if it be a state, is still a grade below them all: 
for not to be able to alienate without permission of the remainder-man or 
lord, places them in a state of feudal dependence." 117 The argument is 
circular because it was the· United States' predecessors in interest who 
took away the Indians' sovereign power to alienate the land; this power 
was taken away without the Indians' knowledge or consent, in violation 
of international law. Fortunately, since Johnson's assertions were in a 
116. Steven P. McS10y, "Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st 
Century," 20 N. y.u. Rev. of Law & Social Change 217, 299 (1993). 
117. Cherokee Nation, supra note 11, at 26-27. 
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concurring opinion, his implication that U.S. authorities are feudal lords 
is without legal force. 
Justice Johnson's concurring opInIon in Cherokee Nation unwittingly 
provided a powerful argument in favor of belated renewal of Indian 
sovereignty when he analogized the Cherokees to the Jews: 
However, I will enlarge no more upon this point; because I 
believe, in one view and in one only, if at all, they are or may be 
deemed a state, though not a sovereign state, at least while they 
occupy a country within our limits. Their condition is something 
like that of the Israelites, when inhabiting the deserts. Though 
without land that they can call theirs in the sense of property, 
their right of personal and self-government has never been taken 
from them; and such a form of government may exist though the 
land occupied be in fact that of another. The right to expel them 
may exist in that other, but the alternative of departing and 
retaining the right of self-government may exist in them. And 
such they certainly do possess; it has never been questioned, nor 
any attempt made at subjugating them as a people, or restraining 
their personal liberty except as to their land and trade. I 18 . 
Although Justice Johnson apparently did not appreciate the significance 
of the whites' taking of Indian lands, and did not intend to offer any 
argument in favor of full sovereignty for Indian nations, his analogy to 
the Jews of Palestine can help us to see more clearly the justification and 
practical possibility of recognizing Indian sovereignty. More than a 
century after Johnson's concurrence in Cherokee Nation, the state of 
Israel was born and accepted into the community of nations. If the 
survivors of the Holocaust, in which six million perished, could be 
allowed to return to their homeland and declare their independence, this 
author recommends that a similar procedure should be allowed for the 
descendants of those who survived the American holocaust. 
Advocating the admission of Israel to the United Nations, Philip C. 
Jessup, the United States representative to the Security Council, recited 
the well-accepted constitutive theory of statehood; the elements are a 
118. Id. at 27. 
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people, a territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations 
with other states. I 19 
Vine Deloria, Jr. wrote: "[W]ho is to say that Indians cannot regain their 
independence in the future? Can one view the re-creation of the state of 
Israel, after two thousand years of exile and seriously maintain that the 
Oglala Sioux will never ride their beloved plains as rulers of everything 
they see? ... If the U.S. can recognize the historic claim of a specific 
people to land in the Middle East, there is no reason in fact or law to 
continue to ignore the claim of the native Americans to territorial 
sovereignty over a small portion of their historic land."120 After all, as 
Susan Lope has pointed out, "Native Americans ... exist today as 
independent cultures, with their own religions, languages and 
governments. ,,121 
B. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
The United States should give consideration to taking a posItive 
approach toward international law instruments that support the rights of 
indigenous peoples. Thus, wherever practical, the United States should 
employ its voice and its vote in international forums in support of 
implementation of the human rights provisions of these instruments. 
These include the 1977 Geneva Draft Declaration of Principles for the 
Defense of the Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western 
Hemisphere ("Indigenous peoples shall be accorded recognition as 
nations .... " art. 1); the 1984 Panama Declaration of Principles of 
Indigenous Rights ("Indigenous people shall have exclusive rights to 
their traditional lands .... " Principle 9); the 1987 Geneva Declaration of 
Principles on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ("Indigenous nations and 
peoples are entitled to the permanent control and enjoyment of their 
aboriginal ancestral-historical territories." art. 4); the 1991 Geneva 
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries ("The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples 
concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be 
recognized." art. 14, para. 1); and the 1995 Draft of the Inter-American 
Declaration on the rights of Indigenous peoples (" ... in many indigenous 
cultures, traditional collective systems for control and use of land and 
119. 3 UN SCOR, 383 mtg., Dec. 2, 1948, pp. 9-12, cited by Henken et aI, International Law, 
supra note 18, at 246. 
120. Vine Deloria, Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of 
Independence 183-185 (1974), quoted by Susan Lope, supra note 93, at 356. 
121. Susan Lope, supra note 106, at 352. 
34
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 6 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol6/iss1/9
2000] NATIVE AMERICAN INDIAN PROPERTY 209 
territory ... are a necessary condition for their survival ... and collective 
well-being." Preamble, para. 6).122 
c. RECONCILIATION 
A high-level, broad-based commission should be established to conduct a 
serious public study of the feasibility of restoring Indian nationhood 
within practical boundaries. The President of the United States should 
appoint Indians and non-Indians, lawyers and non-lawyers, lawmakers 
and citizens, historians and futurists to the commission. The members 
should be people of diverse philosophies and faiths who share a 
commitment to human rights, an understanding of international affairs, 
and an open-minded willingness to seek practical compromise. 
The State Department should conduct a review of United States 
obligations with respect to Native Americans under international human 
rights law. In the meantime, responsible agencies should redouble 
efforts immediately to improve health, education and welfare standards 
for Indian people. 
And let all Americans learn the history and treasure the culture of the 
Indians. Let us express our remorse for the betrayals of the past, and 
begin the millenium with a vow to honor the people of all nations. 
Then we shall be reconciled with the descendants of those who 
welcomed our forebears to the land of the free. 
122. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, supra note 6, appendix at 185-219. 
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